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Inflation and Sovereign Default
TURALAY KENC, WILLIAM PERRAUDIN, and PAOLO VITALE*
Recent research has highlighted the role that the government budget constraint
plays in determining the consumer price level. According to the fiscal approach to
price determination, prices adjust so that the discounted value of future real
government primary surpluses equals the current real value of public debt. An
important implication is that the probability of a crisis involving default on public
debt may directly affect consumer prices. This paper examines the interaction of
prices and sovereign insolvency crises using simple, continuous-time models of
the government budget constraint.  [JEL E40, E63, F34, H63]
R
ecent research on the fiscal approach to price determination (see Leeper,
1991; Sims, 1994; Woodford, 1995, 1996; Canzoneri and Diba, 1996; and
Cochrane, 1998) suggests a radical new view of monetary policy and price level
determination. If the resources available to service government debt are predeter-
mined and do not automatically adjust to satisfy the government’s long-run
solvency constraint, other variables, most notably the price level, will adjust.
Policies of this type are called non-Ricardian in contrast to more traditional,
Ricardian policies in which governments always adjust their real debt service
flows to satisfy their intertemporal budget constraint.
The interest of the new approach is its strong and novel implications. For
example, many governments follow monetary policies based on interest rate
targets, and such targets are often recommended by international agencies such as
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the IMF. Some have argued, on the basis of some well-established results of
macroeconomic theory (Sargent and Wallace, 1975), that fixing time paths for
nominal interest rates leaves the price level indeterminate and is therefore an ill-
conceived policy. In a non-Ricardian policy regime, interest rate targets make
perfect sense, however, since the price level is pinned down by the nominal
government debt.
Furthermore, the fiscal approach provides justification for the view of some
policymakers that fiscal rectitude is a prerequisite for price stability. IMF price
stabilization programs place heavy emphasis on securing improvements in budget
balance as a way of reducing inflation. The stability pact agreed by participants in
the new single European currency may also be viewed as an attempt to contain
price pressures by limiting  fiscal expansion.
Surprisingly, the new literature on the fiscal approach has tended to ignore
how prices and inflation are affected by actual defaults. In most models, prices or
other variables are assumed to adjust so that, in equilibrium, the government
budget constraint does hold and there is no insolvency. In this paper, we seek to
fill this gap. We analyze simple models of the government budget constraint under
different assumptions about the hazard that default will occur.
Section I of this paper reviews the basic arguments behind the fiscal
approach, contrasting it with more standard analysis of Ricardian policies, and
then describes what happens if defaults can occur in equilibrium. Section II
describes some simple continuous time models of the government budget
constraint. Section III solves for the paths followed by prices and discusses
comparative dynamics. Section IV considers alternative assumptions regarding
what happens when default takes place. Section V concludes the paper. Proofs are
provided in the Appendix.
I. The New Fiscal Approach and Sovereign Debt
Fiscal Policy and Price Determination
The main hypothesis of the new fiscal approach to price determination is that,
forgiven time paths of interest rates and prices, a government may adopt a fiscal
policy which involves never repaying debt. Instead, it plans to roll over the debt
forever. For the private sector to be willing to hold the current debt stock,
however, the present discounted value of future government surpluses must equal
the market value of the debt stock. If the government’s fiscal instruments are
predetermined, market prices must adjust to restore equilibrium.
In flexible price models that explore this idea (see, for example, Woodford,
1994), the variable that equilibrates shifts in discounted future government
surpluses is the aggregate price level. If a fiscal shock cuts the real value of
discounted primary surpluses, the price level rises to reduce the current real value
of the government’s nominal debt. If prices or wages are sticky reflecting the
presence of overlapping nominal contracts, for example, both the price level and
real interest rates will adjust to equilibrate shocks to government surpluses (see
Woodford, 1996).The assumption that the government’s fiscal instruments are predetermined
and outside the influence of the monetary authorities is crucial to the above argu-
ment. If fiscal surpluses were automatically increased whenever government debt
rose so as to balance the present value (intertemporal) budget constraint for any
time path of prices and real interest rates, then the government budget constraint
would play no role in determining prices. Policies of this type are termed
Ricardian by Woodford and others, while policies in which the government’s
fiscal instruments are predetermined are called non-Ricardian.
One should notice that the connection between fiscal and monetary policy
explored by Woodford, Sims, and others is distinct from the well-known linkages
discussed by Sargent and Wallace (1985). In the Sargent-Wallace analysis, money
issuance adjusts so that discounted real seigniorage equals future discounted
primary deficits. Sargent and Wallace (1985) assume for simplicity that all
government debt is indexed, thereby precluding gains to the government from
erosion in the real value of debt when prices rise. In contrast, the Leeper-Sims-
Woodford analysis turns crucially on this latter kind of gain and supposes that the
flow of seigniorage from money issuance adjusts passively so as to maintain equi-
librium in the money market.
Implications of the Fiscal Approach
According to the simple quantity theory if the interest rate is pegged, the price
level (Pt) is indeterminate since the money supply (Mt) is adjusted passively and
Mt and Pt only enter the model in the form of a ratio. However, as mentioned
above, if a non-Ricardian policy is followed, wealth effects of the kind examined
by Woodford, Sims, and the other authors cited, are introduced, and the price level
is once again determinate, since for a given nominal bond stock, variations in
prices affect real behavior through a wealth effect and only one set of prices will
then be consistent with equilibrium.
Indeed, as Woodford (1995) points out, under non-Ricardian policies, changes
in the monetary policy affect the price level only insofar as they interfere with the
present value budget constraint, that is, through seigniorage. Cochrane (1998)
suggests that monetary effects have only a second-order impact on the price level.
He even advocates that one abstract from monetary considerations in the study of
price determination.1
Another implication of the fiscal approach is that governments may need to
coordinate fiscal and monetary policies in order to control inflation. Woodford
(1996) and Canzoneri and Diba (1996) argue that the Maastricht criteria for entry
into the projected European currency union that included limits on government
debt and fiscal deficits are justified on these grounds.
A further consequence of the fiscal approach is that one may observe regime
changes as a government changes from a Ricardian to a non-Ricardian policy or
vice versa. The regime which prevails will be determined by market perceptions
Turalay Kenc, William Perraudin, and Paolo Vitale
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1In this paper, we follow Cochrane’s advice in that we construct an equilibrium model where money
supply is set passively in order to satisfy its current demand.of the rules followed by fiscal and monetary authorities and, hence, may be quite
unstable.2
The Fiscal Approach and Sovereign Default
Surprisingly, given the basic thrust of the fiscal approach literature, there has been
no consideration of how actual defaults affect outcomes. In the papers of
Woodford and others, default is something that occurs only on off-equilibrium
paths. So, although it affects the evolution of prices (which change in order to
bring the economy back into equilibrium), defaults take place with probability
zero. In this paper, we consider what happens if default is possible.
Our analysis yields novel links between sovereign default and inflation. To
seethe novelty, note that in standard monetary models of price determination, a
country’s debt burden and possible default have no direct impact on nominal poli-
cies. Furthermore, to the extent that it deals with macroeconomic effects, the
sovereign debt literature (summarized by Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996, Chapter 6; and
surveyed,for example, by Eaton and Fernandez, 1995) concentrates on real distor-
tions that may follow from heavy indebtedness, without tracing, through the govern-
ment budget constraint, how macroeconomic policy more generally may be
affected.
Investigating links between sovereign default and monetary policy seems
natural. For governments in the throes of stabilization and transition to market
economies, for example, the two most pressing macroeconomic issues are how to
control prices and how to manage indebtedness to the foreign and private sectors.
In principle, the new fiscal approach to price determination might suggest that
these two issues maybe closely connected.
To examine these issues, we develop simple continuous-time models of price
determination under different assumptions about the government’s default proba-
bility.From the government budget constraint, we obtain equilibrium conditions
that prices must satisfy. These conditions, which are nonlinear differential equa-
tions, are then solved subject to boundary conditions implied by the government’s
long run solvency.
Whether the default crisis involves all or some of the debt and whether fiscal
policy after default still determines the price level have crucial impacts on the
results. When the post crisis fiscal policy is still predetermined, we find that the risk
of default creates positive pressure on prices before the crisis takes place.This pres-
sure is greater the larger is the fraction of the debt on which the sovereign would
default. Again, when post crisis fiscal policy is Ricardian, default itself has no
instantaneous impact on prices which follow a continuous path.
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2Several recent empirical studies have examined whether the U.S. postwar fiscal policy satisfies long-
run solvency conditions. These include Hamilton and Flavin (1986), Kremers (1989), and Wilcox (1989).
In general, these studies conclude that U.S. fiscal policy prior to the 1980s was sustainable and hence
consistent with solvency if the fiscal deficit was adjusted for the impact of inflation on nominal govern-
ment debt. However, Kremers (1989) and Wilcox (1989) raise doubts about the sustainability of policies
in the 1980s.The results are quite different if default is partial and fiscal policy
continues to be non-Ricardian after the crisis. In this case, possible future
default places no pressure on prices before the crisis takes place. Default itself
is deflationary, however, in that prices jump down discretely when the crisis
occurs. The interest rate on nominal debt which is known not to be subject to
default will actually be lower than the inflation rate since its holders know that
they will benefit in real terms from the deflationary consequences of default
on other debt.
II. A Fiscal Approach to Inflation
Basic Assumptions
We begin by setting out notation and basic assumptions about government
behaviour. Suppose that the government issues short-term nominal debt with value
Dt, money of value Mt, and indexed debt with nominal value Pt
~ Dt. Here, Pt is the
level of consumer prices.
At any given time, let the Quantity Theory hold in that money market equi-
librium is equivalent to
MtV = PtYt, (1)
where V is a constant velocity parameter and Yt denotes total real output. For
simplicity, in the remainder of the paper we shall suppose that Yt=Y is constant.3
Suppose that at a random date, T, a crisis occurs and the government defaults
on its debt. The probability that such a crisis takes place between t and t + ∆ , given
that it has not so far occurred, is assumed to be
(2)
where λ s ≡λ (s) is a real-valued, non-negative function defined for all s ≥ 0.
Below, we shall consider cases in which λ t is constant or increasing over time.
The latter case corresponds to situations in which the market is increasingly
fearful of default. To motivate our modeling of a default hazard as a function of
time, we show, in Figure 1, spreads over U.S. Treasuries of U.S.-dollar-
denominated Brazilian and Russian debt.4 When defaults and interest rates are
independent (as they are in our model since interest rates are assumed to be
Prob exp , Tt Tt d s s
t
t
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3In other related models, notably Woodford (1994, 1995), an equilibrium demand for money is obtained
from the solution of a representative agent’s utility maximization problem. Instead, in the present context we
choose to simply employ the quantity theory, as we follow Cochrane’s claim that a simple fiscal theory of
price determination can abstract from monetary considerations. Indeed, in the solution for the equilibrium path
for the price level, we introduce the rather stark assumption that the velocity of circulation of money in (1) is
very high. This is equivalent to the cashless economy employed by Cochrane (1998).
4The spreads are yields to maturity on the Brazilian 8 percent government bond maturing in 2014, and
the Russian 3 percent bond issue maturing on 2011, less the yield to maturity on the U.S. Treasury 8 1/8
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Figure 1. Crisis Country Spreads Over U.S. Treasury Yields
Note: The difference between the yield-to-maturity of the indicated bond and that of the U.S.
Treasury 8 1/8 of 2019 is plotted against time. The vertical lines indicate the date of the Brazilian deval-
uation (i.e., 13th January, 1999) and the date of the Russian default on domestic debt (i.e. 17th August,nonstochastic), and agents are risk neutral (or risks are diversifiable), the spread
on short bonds equals the instantaneous hazard of default.
The vertical lines in each chart show the dates of the January 1999 Brazilian
currency crisis and the August 1998 default by the Russian government. It is
noticeable that the spreads in Figure 1 fluctuate substantially over time. In the case
of Brazilian spreads, there is a clear trend upwards in spreads in the period before
the crisis as the market became concerned about possible default (which, of
course, did not transpire).In the case of the Russian bonds, the spread is noticeably
at in the period prior to the crisis.
Modeling default by specifying an exogenously given default rate, λ t, is an
approach followed by a series of recent papers in the finance literature, see Jarrow
and Turnbull (1995) and Duffie and Singleton (1997) and the papers cited therein.
The alternative that Duffie and Singleton and others refer to as the structural
approach is to suppose that default is triggered when some process (e.g., firm
value or sovereign borrower ability-to-pay) crosses a threshold either at the matu-
rity of the debt or before.
Papers on sovereign debt valuation that take this latter “structural” approach
include Bartolini and Dixit (1991) and Cohen (1993). Ideally, one would like the
moment of default to be determined by the optimizing decision of the government.
Modeling this explicitly is difficult, however, and even so-called structural models
specify the default triggers in an ad hoc fashion.
The fact that the default decision is not endogenized in our model is not a
serious drawback. Various of the results we obtain hold for different specifications
of λ (t) so it is legitimate to hold the functional form constant and then to analyze
the impact of possible future default on prices and inflation. The one important
restriction that we impose is the assumption that default comes at least in part as
a surprise. This seems to us realistic and indeed the instantaneously predictable
nature of default in the Bartolini-Dixit and Cohen models is questionable.5
Returning to our description of government behaviour, let Wt denote the total
nominal value of government bonds, i.e., Wt ≡ Dt + Pt
~ Dt, and let Xt denote total
government liabilities, i.e., Xt ≡ Dt + Mt + Pt
~ Dt. Suppose that the government’s
debt issuance policy is such that
(3)
for constant ξ . Prior to default, suppose that Wt grows at an exogenously specified
rate, µ w, so that6
DW P D W tt t t t == − ( ) ξξ         and         , ˜ 1
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5By ruling out surprises, their models imply that the default premium of short debt is zero except when the
sovereign ceases to service the debt fully. In principle, their models could be extended to allow for surprise
defaults and non-zero default premia on short debt by incorporating jump components into their state variables.
6The assumption that there exists an exogenously given growth rate for the nominal value of the
government bonds is analogous to the assumption of Cochrane (1998) that the face value of government
liabilities is given. This appears justified in the case of developing countries in which the dynamics of
public spending and tax revenues are often outside the control of central authorities.(4)
The Government’s Flow Financing Constraint
Let Rt and Gt denote the government’s tax revenues and spending expressed in real
terms. The real primary surplus is then gt ≡ Rt – Gt. Let r be an exogenously spec-
ified real interest rate, assumed fixed.7
We now adopt three important assumptions.
1. Suppose the default is total (involving all the debt) and that the government
cannot subsequently borrow in the bond market.8
2. Assume that prior to default, the real primary surplus is an exogenously given
function of time, gt = g0 exp[µ gt], while money is adjusted passively to ensure
that the Quantity Equation holds.
3. Suppose that after default, Mt is adjusted according to an exogenously given
growth rule while the real primary surplus, gt, is adjusted to maintain the
government’s long-run solvency (in a sense to be defined precisely below).9
These assumptions imply that prior to the default crisis, fiscal policy is exoge-
nous and monetary policy reacts passively, while after default fiscal policy is
endogenous and monetary policy is exogenously given. When fiscal policy or
monetary policy are exogenous, we shall say that prices are respectively fiscally
or monetarily determined.
As we demonstrate below, the effect of our three assumptions is that prior to
default the price level is fiscally determined in the way described above, while
afterwards it is determined by the classic Quantity Theory. In Section IV, we shall
discuss what happens if prices are fiscally determined both before and after default
(i.e., as an alternative to assumption 3). We shall also examine the consequences
of default on only a fraction of the total debt stock (i.e., relaxing assumption 1).
As we show in the Appendix, subject to the above assumptions, prior to
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7For simplicity, we shall not include real capital in the model. The assumption of a fixed real interest
rate may not, therefore, be justified in the usual way by supposing a constant returns to scale “storage-
type” technology. However, the real interest rate will still be constant under several sets of assumptions.
For instance, if one assumes that agents have linear utility functions with constant subjective rates of time
preference, or that their utilities are simply separable over time and consumption is constant. In these
cases, the real interest rate will then be equal to the time preference rate.
8This might seem an extreme assumption, but it is meant to reflect the difficulties developing coun-
tries encounter when they try to access international bond markets after default.
9Notice that in order to determine the equilibrium dynamics of the price level in the Ricardian regime
prevailing after default, we need to assume that the money supply follows a continuous path.Turalay Kenc, William Perraudin, and Paolo Vitale
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Here, the left hand side represents sources of nominal funds including (i) the
nominal primary surplus, Ptgt, (ii) plus the increase in debt, µ wWt, (iii) minus the
cost of revaluing indexed debt, (1–ξ )Wt(dPt/dt)/Pt, and (iv) plus the change in the
nominal money stock, dMt/dt.
The right hand side shows the uses to which these resources are put, namely (i)
interest payments on the nominal debt, (r + λ t + (dPt/dt)/Pt)ξ Wt, and (ii) interest
payments on the indexed debt, (r + λ t)(1 – ξ )Wt. Note that both interest rates include
compensation for the fact that if default occurs the values of the debt stocks, Dt and
Pt
~ Dt, jump to zero (see the λ t terms).
Rearranging and substituting for dMt/dt using the Quantity Equation, one
obtains:
(6)
Since gt and Wt are exogenously given functions of time, equation (6) is a non-
linear differential equation determining the price level, Pt. This equation may be
solved subject to a boundary condition that follows from the government’s long-
run solvency condition.
Long-Run Solvency
For simplicity, one may think of there being just two sectors in the economy, the
government and the private sector. In the Appendix, we show that if the private sector
is on its long run intertemporal budget constraint (i.e., satisfies a transversality condi-
tion on its borrowing), the government’s ability to borrow is also constrained. This
generates a long-run solvency condition for the government, namely
(7)
Equation (7) says that the total nominal liabilities of the government, X0, must
equal the expected discounted resources it has available to service them. The latter
resources comprise the exogenous flow of nominal primary surpluses, Ptgt, plus
the flow of profits that the central bank makes on its monopoly control of money
issuance,(r + (dPt/dt)/Pt)Mt.
Now, recall our assumptions that default is complete so that debt values jump
to zero when default occurs and that after default, the economy shifts into a mone-
tarily determined equilibrium. If T is the default date, we deduce that
(8)
Using equation (8), one may evaluate the expectation in equation (7) to obtain:
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where Pt is now not the actual price level but instead is the price level under the
assumption that default has not yet occurred at t. Substituting for Ms using the
money market equilibrium condition and rearranging, we finally have
(10)
This is the fundamental equation that the price level must satisfy when default is
complete and prices are monetarily determined after default.
III. Price Solutions
Constant Default Rate
Explicitly solving the price determination equation, (6), subject to the boundary
condition, (10), is difficult because of their highly nonlinear nature. However, if
velocity is high, so that the terms involving Y = V are negligibly small, or the
economy is cashless, so that these terms disappear altogether, fully analytic solu-
tions maybe obtained. In this section, we study these analytic solutions. It is
important to note that, in assuming high velocity, we are merely supposing that ow
of receipts from seigniorage is small compared with the size of the government
deficit. For many countries, this is true although probably not for those experi-
encing hyperinflation.10
To begin with, suppose that the default rate is constant in that λ t =
–
λ . This case
corresponds to the situation experienced by Russia in the run up to their default as
illustrated by the plot in Figure 1. As we show in the Appendix, under the assump-
tion of high velocity, the general solution to equation (6) is
(11)
where A is a free constant to be determined from the boundary condition and
η≡ (r +
–
λ – µ g). Under the assumption of high velocity, the government’s long-
run solvency condition is:
(12) gr s d s
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10Between the mid 1960s and the late 1980s seigniorage levels, as reported by Little, Cooper, Corden,
and Rajapatirana (1991), do not exceed 2/3 percent for most developing countries. Argentina,with levels
close to 10 percent, has been the main exception.Substituting for P0 and solving, one may show (see the Appendix) that A =0 .
Hence,the price level is:
(13)
This simple solution is log-linear in time and implies a constant inflation rate:
(14)
Though the inflation rate is independent of the default rate, from equation (13), the
price level, Pt, is increasing in
–
λ . The intuition here is that increasing the default rate
lowers the expected present discounted value of the flow of real debt service. Since
(subject to our simplifying assumptions), this has to equal the current real value of
the debt, the price level must be higher.
Comparative Dynamics of the λ t = 
–
λ Case
It is helpful to understand the geometry of the price solutions. Qualitative features of
the phase diagram for log prices are illustrated in Figure 2. For each value of the free
constant A, prices follow a different trajectory. When A = 0, log Pt is linear in t with
a slope µ w – µ g and intercept log(–ηW0/g0). When A > 0, for large t, log Pt asymp-
totes to a linear function with slope µ w – µ g +η and intercept log(–ηW0/g0). If
–1<A < 0, the trajectory explodes to infinity in finite time. The trajectory corre-
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Figure 2. Phase Portrait for log Pt when λ t =
–
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Using our knowledge of the phase portrait, one may analyze the comparative





λ 2 > 
–
λ 1 occurring at time t0. The effect of this is shown in Figure 3. The log price
level jumps instantaneously at t0 from the old trajectory to a new higher trajectory,
parallel to the first. The jump size is simply log((r +
–
λ 2 – µ g)/(r + 
–
λ 1 – µ g)). 
Now, consider an anticipated future rise in the rate of default, λ t = 
–
λ . Suppose
that the increase takes place at t1 and is announced at t0 <  t1. The resulting
dynamics are shown in Figure 4. Initially, there is a positive jump in the price level,
followed by movement along one of the explosive trajectories shown in Figure 2.
At t1, prices hit a higher linear trajectory and then follow this for t > t1.
The Increasing Default Rate Case
Now consider the case in which the default rate is increasing over time. This case
corresponds to the situation experienced by Brazil in the period prior to their
devaluation crisis as illustrated by the plot in Figure 1. When the default rate is a
function of time, the analysis is slightly more complicated. For example, when
λ t = 
–




Figure 3. Rise in Crisis Rate when λ t =
–
λ




λ 0 + t) In this case, the general solution of  the differ-
ential equation comprises confluent hypergometric functions.(15)
where  A is a free constant to be determined from the government’s long-run
solvency condition. Using the latter and substituting for A yields:
(16)
Examining the solution, one may conclude that prices are an increasing function
of time so long as µ w > µ g. As in the constant rate of default case, the price level
Pt is increasing in 
–
λ , other things being equal. The rate of inflation is no longer
constant in the λ t = 
–
λ t case, however. Numerical simulation of the model suggests
that the inflation rate decreases over time.
The qualitative nature of the phase portrait for log Pt when λ t = 
–
λ t resembles
that of the standard case except that the convergent path that satisfies the boundary
condition is convex. (One may show that when A < ∫ 0
∞ exp[–(r – µ g)s – 
–
λ s2/2]ds,
there exists a time, t, when the denominator in equation (15) is null and hence the
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log Pt
t 0 t1 Time
Figure 4. Anticipated Rise in Crisis Rate when λ t =
–
λexplosive.) Hence, the comparative dynamics of the log price level in this case are
broadly similar to those in the constant default rate case.
IV. Alternative Assumptions About Default
Partial Default
Recall our important assumptions (i) that default is complete and involves the
entire debt stock, and (ii) that, after default, prices are ‘monetarily determined’ in
that the real primary surplus, gt, is adjusted to maintain government solvency and
money growth is exogenously specified. Let us consider the effects of relaxing
these assumptions. 
If the government defaults only on part of the debt, it is probably more real-
istic to suppose that the default is on the indexed debt. In our flexible price model,
indexed debt may be thought of as foreign currency borrowings. Countries appear
to default to a greater extent on their external debt which is commonly denomi-
nated in foreign currency. 
Modifying our previous analysis, we find that if the government defaults at T
on its indexed debt, (1 – ξ )WT, and that prices are monetarily determined for t > T,
the financing constraint in equation (5) becomes 
(17)
Thus, the only change is that the default rate λ t is scaled down by a factor 1 – ξ .
When velocity is high so the terms involving money disappear, the general
solutions for prices in our two cases, λ t = 
–
λ and λ t = 
–
λ t, are of exactly the same
form as in equations (11) and (15) except with 
–
λ replaced by 
–
λ (1 – ξ ).
Effectively, the phase portrait for the constant default rate case shown in Figure
2 is shifted down, with the convergent linear path moving down in a strictly
parallel fashion. 
The modification to the boundary condition in equation (10) required when
we assume partial default is more substantial in that the price solution must
satisfy
(18)
If we again restrict attention to the high velocity case, it is clear that the additional
term involving WT = PT on the left hand side is positive and hence the constant of
integration, A, implied by this boundary condition is higher than in the case with
full default. (Recall that this was A = 0).
g r dP dt P
Y





















































t ++ = + − ( ) + 


 µξ λ 1.
INFLATION AND SOVEREIGN DEFAULT
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convergent linear solution for log prices downwards and (ii) to generate a positive
constant of integration. We may conclude in the constant λ t case that with partial
default prices are unambiguously lower than with full default.
Fiscal Price Determination After Default
Finally, consider how the results are affected if, following default, the govern-
ment’s primary surplus continues to follow an exogenously given path and money
is adjusted passively to maintain money market equilibrium. In other words, prices
are fiscally determined for t greater than the random default time, T. In fact,
default must be partial for such a post-default equilibrium to make sense. (In such
an equilibrium, in the absence of nominal bonds, prices only appear in the govern-
ment solvency condition and the Quantity Equation either as a ratio to Mt or in the
inflation rate. Since money is assumed endogenous, it is easy to show that the
price level is not pinned down.) So, we shall assume that the government defaults
completely on its indexed debt, Pt
~ Dt, but not on the nominal debt, Dt. 
It might appear that the analysis will be more complicated under these
assumptions, since in general the price level will now jump at default and holders
of the nominal debt must be compensated for this possibility by a new term in
nominal interest rates. For the simpler high velocity case, the financing constraints
for the government thus become:
(19)
(20)
where Jt is minus the proportional jump in the real value of nominal bonds that
occurs when default takes place at T. Since the government primary surplus, gt, is
exogenously given for all t, it follows that
(21)
Since the right hand side of equation (21) is continuous in time, the jump in the
real value of the debt at t should default occur at that date is
(22)
Substituting for Jt in equation (20), we find that λ t(ξ Jt +( 1– ξ )) = 0 and the
financing constraint is unaffected by the default rate λ t both before and after the
default date, T. Since the boundary condition does not directly depend on λ t, it is
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government is made neither worse nor better off by default since the amount of
discounted resources it devotes to debt service (the right hand side of equation
(21)) does not jump at T. However, default represents a tax on defaultable debt
holders. Thus, when default occurs, the real value of remaining debt must rise as
the gains to investors who hold the non-defaultable nominal debt must precisely
offset the losses of investors who hold the defaultable, indexed debt. This is
possible only if the price level jumps down making the holders of the nominal debt
better off in real terms.12
V. Conclusion
This paper has investigated the behaviour of prices and inflation when the real
primary surplus is exogenously given. In these circumstances, for investors to be
willing to hold government debt, consumer prices must adjust so that the real
value of the government debt equals the discounted value of the primary surplus.
The novelty of our analysis is the interaction that may arise between this fiscal
theory of price determination and possible crises involving default on the govern-
ment debt.
For most of the paper, we concentrate on models in which the fiscally deter-
mined price regime switches to a more standard monetarily determined regime at
default. In this case, our analysis suggests that prices are increasing in the rate of
default. The intuition is that a higher default rate reduces the expected discounted
value of real primary surpluses. To compensate, consumer prices must increase so
as to ensure the government’s long-run solvency.
The dependence of the inflation rate on the default rate is more complex. We
show that unanticipated changes in the default rate generate intuitively reasonable
dynamics. When the rate of default is a given function, inflation is independent of
the default rate when the latter is constant but may be decreasing when, for
example, λ t = 
–
λ t.
We find that when nominal and indexed debt (for which one may read
domestic and foreign currency debt if purchasing power parity holds) are treated
symmetrically in the event of default (so for example the same fraction of each is
subject to default), then the two forms of debt enter the model symmetrically. The
implication is that what matters for inflationary pressure is the total debt rather
than the nominal (or domestic currency) debt alone.
This result follows from the fact that the costs of servicing indexed (or
foreign) debt crowd out resources which would otherwise have been available for
the servicing of nominal debt. Hence, higher indexed (or foreign) debt has the
same inflationary impact as nominal (domestic currency) debt. 
When default is partial in that the government defaults only on indexed debt,
we find that the basic analysis continues to apply except that prices are somewhat
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lower. Pushing up the fraction of debt on which the authorities might default there-
fore results in higher prices and inflation. 
If default is partial and prices are fiscally rather than monetarily determined
after the crisis date, T, then the price level jumps down at default, i.e., default is
deflationary. The proportional price jump is equal to the fraction of debt on which
default occurs and the real value of government debt is continuous at the crisis
date T. Prior to the crisis, however, the possibility of default has no impact on the
path followed by inflation or prices.
Again, with partial default followed by a fiscally determined equilibrium,
investors holding debt on which default will not occur are actually willing to
accept an interest rate lower than the sum of the inflation rate and the real interest
rate. In other words, the interest rate on non-defaultable, nominal debt contains a
discount to allow for the jump in the real value that takes place at default.
APPENDIX
Proof of Equation (5)
Assume that time periods are discrete and of length ∆ . The period by period budget constraint
faced by the government prior to default is:
(23)
So far, we have developed our model in discrete time. However, difference equations are not
particularly easy to analyse. Taking a continuous time limit, one may obtain simple, explicit,
closed-form solutions. Dividing through by ∆ and letting the time interval shrink to zero (i.e.,
∆↓ 0) in equation (23) yields equation (5) from the text.
Proof of Equation (7)
Let us start with the latter’s period by period financing constraint: 
(24)
where 1{t} is an indicator function for whether or not the default crisis has occurred, defined as
(25)
(26)
Define it and qt as follows:
(27)
Using the goods market equilibrium condition:
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With strictly positive marginal utility, a necessary condition for consumers to be in equilibrium
is the transversality condition:
(32)
If this did not hold, consumers could always raise their utility by increasing consumption. It
follows that
(33)
Again, we wish to take a continuous time limit since this will permit us to obtain tractable solu-
tions. So, consider what happens as ∆↓ 0. Since
(34)
it follows that in the limit the government solvency constraint becomes equation (7) from the
main text. 
Proof of Equation (13)
Suppose that velocity V is large so that equation (6) simplifies and the behavior of prices prior
to default is determined by
(35)
The right-hand side of equation (35) is quadratic in Pt. To eliminate the quadratic term, apply
the Ricatti transformation, defining a new variable
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CGY tt t += ,Substituting in equation (35), one then obtains
(37)
Cancelling terms, one obtains the relatively simple linear equation:
(38)
Different assumptions about the time paths of the rate of default λ t = λ (t) then yield different
solutions for the price level. There are two cases which we examine below, namely (i) constant
crisis rate, λ t = 
–
λ , and (ii) increasing crisis rate, λ t = 
–
λ t.
Now, suppose that the crisis rate is constant (i.e., λ t = 
–
λ ), henceforth referred to as the stan-
dard case. Then the differential equation satisfied by prices has the well-known solution
(39)
where ηi, i = 1, 2 are the roots of
(40)
(41)
Substituting back yields equation (11) given in the text where A ≡ A1/A2 (assume A2 ≠ 0) To
pin down the free constant, A, consider the private sector budget constraint, (12). Integrating in
equation (12) and substituting for P0, we obtain:
(42)
Hence, the price level is simply equation (13) as it appears in the text. 
Proof of Equation (16)
If λ t = 
–
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385(45)
Integrating a second time yields:
(46)
Reversing the Ricatti transformation gives equation (15) from the main text where A ≡ –A2/A1.
To determine the free parameter A, use the solvency condition to obtain:
(47)
Rearranging yields equation (16) from the text. 
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